MODELS OF CUSTOMS AUDIT ORGANIZATION
( Pp. 113-116)

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Latypov Ruslan Zaharovich aspirant. Dolzhnost: starshiy operupolnomochennyy.
Vladimir customs house of the Central Customs Administration of the Federal Customs Service of Russian Federation; Russian сustoms academy
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Abstract:
Objective: improving the efficiency of customs control on the territory of the Customs Union using determining of the optimal inspection rule. Researching the problems of tax evasion was held by such foreign scholars as I. Sanches, J. Sobel, F. Cowell, G. Gordon, P. Chandler, L. Wilde. Model: to research the problems of customs duties evasion has been applied the theory of games. Conclusion: in result of held research has been obtained formulas that allow to determine the optimal inspection rule giving the opportunity to maximize government revenue. The possibility of subsequent use of the results of scientific research: the results of given research can be used in determining plan indicators of performance of customs control after releasing the goods divisions of the Russian Federal Customs Service. Practical importance: the results of given research will help to reduce the cost of inspection activities, increase its efficiency, to maintain law in the field of foreign trade relations, and as a result, maximize the net government income of implementation of the customs functions. Value: work is for the General Department of customs control after releasing the goods of the Russian Federal Customs Service.
How to Cite:
Latypov R.Z., (2014), MODELS OF CUSTOMS AUDIT ORGANIZATION. Business in Law, 1: 113-116.
Reference list:
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Keywords:
customs control, customs audit, game theory, the optimal inspection rule.